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Low-wage workers face a career threatened by job loss due to the vagaries of the economy, the volatile sectors of the
job market they work in, and personal crises that can lead to interruptions in their employment. While low-wage work-
ers are more vulnerable than higher-wage workers to unemployment, they are far less likely to have access to unem-
ployment benefits. Unemployment insurance (UI) benefits can prevent low-income Americans from falling into poverty
during an unexpected spell of temporary joblessness. Moreover, UI is a work-based safety net that rewards labor force
attachment and provides pathways to reemployment. 
Increasing the participation of low-wage workers in the UI program requires a number of reforms to eligibility rules and
administrative practices. The alternative base period (ABP) is a key policy reform that has been proposed to level the
playing field for low-wage workers.
  The alternative base period corrects a timing flaw that unnecessarily limits UI eligibility. UI eligibility is deter-
mined by analyzing earnings records reported by employers each quarter. These records are the basis of a base period
year (4 quarters) of earnings for an UI claim. Because of processing delays, the standard base period (SBP) excludes up
to six months of a worker’s earnings. In states with the ABP, claimants who fail the SBP can use more of their recent
wages to meet state eligibility requirements. Under the ABP, claimants must meet the same rules as SBP claimants but
they can use a more recent four-quarter period to do so.
  States are increasingly adopting the alternative base period. A total of nineteen states and the District of
Columbia have adopted the ABP (Connecticut, District of Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Massachusetts,
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont,
Virginia, Washington, and Wisconsin). Half of these states have implemented the ABP in the last five years. However, no
research has been conducted on ABP implementation since 1997.
This study examines the ABP using the Survey of Income and Program Participation (SIPP) to estimate the share of work-
ers who meet the current UI monetary eligibility requirements in their state and the share who would be eligible under
different rules. In addition, we conducted two surveys of the state agencies that have implemented the ABP. The ABP
Benefits Survey include benefit payment information and characteristics of UI claimants, while the ABP Administrative
Costs survey reports on the expenses involved in moving to the ABP and the procedures used to process claims. We find
that:
  Thousands of additional jobless workers per year would become monetarily eligible for UI benefits if the
ABP was implemented nationwide. Due to the implementation of the ABP so far, 211,000 more jobless workers were
monetarily eligible for UI benefits in 2003; and the expansion of UI benefits to the entire nation would have increased
monetary eligibility by a total of 439,000 workers in 2003.
2  The UI eligibility of low-wage workers is substantially increased through the alternative base period. Our nation-
al simulation indicates that jobless low-wage workers (in the bottom quartile of all earners) make up nearly two-thirds
(58.3 percent) of all those who need the ABP to qualify for UI; but make up just over a third (37.6 percent) of those who
qualify under the SBP. The actual experience in Michigan was that 17.4 percent of all low-wage workers who received UI
needed the ABP, as compared to just 1.6 percent of higher-wage workers. 
  ABP benefits contribute to poverty prevention.The total annual asset value of UI checks obtained through the ABP
ranges from $1,600 in Virginia to $4,600 in Michigan. ABP benefits replace a large share of the prior earnings of these work-
ers, which average $10,000 per year, and are more generous than welfare (TANF) benefits. Michigan paid out $86 million in
ABP benefits in 2003, a sum equivalent to 25 percent of all TANF cash assistance in the state that year.
  The ABP has only a modest overall impact on the total UI program. The SIPP data indicates that overall UI mone-
tary eligibility would have increased by 7.2 percent in 2003 if all states had implemented the ABP. In states that have
implemented the ABP, between 2.1 and 6.5 percent of all eligible claims used the ABP. ABP eligible claims only represent
1.1 to 5.2 percent of all UI payouts in these states, because ABP claimants qualify for far less in UI benefits. 
  Many younger workers and people of color need the alternative base period to become eligible for UI benefits.
Both African-Americans and Hispanics are more than 1.5 times more likely than white workers to utilize the ABP for their
monetary eligibility. Younger workers, age 16 to 25, are more than twice as likely as older workers to qualify through the ABP.
The ABP can help to remedy a pervasive problem of the lack of access to UI facing younger workers and people or color.
Despite the relatively small proportion of claims needing the ABP to become eligible, the ABP requires important concep-
tual, procedural and technical changes to the monetary eligibility protocols used to process UI claims. The state agencies
that responded to the Administrative Costs Survey indicated that they were able to address these challenges without
unduly straining their agencies, employers or claimants.
  States newly implementing the alternative base period were able to turn to internal staff to make needed
changes to agency computer programs. It took agency staff an average of 1,000 work-hours to make the needed modifi-
cations, which translates into a $60,000 cost. This is a significant cost savings compared to using an outside contractor. 
  ABP implementation generally requires one half-day of training for the line staff responsible for processing
claims.
  States have found innovative ways to obtain the more recent earnings information needed to process ABP
claims. Increased electronic filing of wage reports has allowed agencies to speed the process of applying earnings to ABP
claims. In the cases when records are not available, most states utilize quick responses forms sent to both employers and
claimants to get the needed information within two weeks after the claim is filed. Wage requests present only a small bur-
den on employers, amounting to no more than 8,000 requests or just 3 percent of all claims per state.
34
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INTRODUCTION & POLICY CONTEXT
ABOUT UI
For America’s working families, UI is the first line of defense against economic insecurity. UI provides temporary
income support to workers who experience an unexpected period of joblessness. The support provided by weekly
UI checks—which amount to up to half of a worker’s prior wage—keep families financially stable until they are able
to find appropriate employment. UI is insurance for unexpected joblessness; it limits the impact of job loss on a 
family’s budget.
To distinguish the program from welfare, UI requires recipients to be bona fide members of the labor force. Jobless
workers prove their labor force status by demonstrating a history of prior work and engaging in an active effort to
seek new employment. UI was established so that workers and their families had assistance before falling into
poverty and needing welfare. 
UI is administered as a joint federal-state partnership. Federal law and administration create general parameters for
the program, but most of the details of benefits and eligibility rules are left to the states. Each state has established
standards for jobless workers to prove that they have earned enough to merit coverage (monetary eligibility). The
remaining requirements related to the reasons for job separation, ability to work, and job search are referred to as
“non-monetary eligibility.”5
LOW-WAGE WORKERS HAVE 
LIMITED ACCESS TO UI BENEFITS
To be an effective first responder to the problems
caused by job loss, UI must cover a broad share of the
unemployed. However, as measured by the percent of 
all jobless individuals receiving an unemployment
check, the effectiveness of the UI system as a safety net
for unemployed workers and their families has ebbed
over time. The UI recipiency rate—the share of the
unemployed receiving UI—dropped from over 50 per-
cent in the 1960s to as low as 30 percent in the early
1980s.
1 While the recipiency rate recovered somewhat
during the jobs slump from 2001-2003, the overall
downward trend has compromised the program.
Further, it is not only that UI coverage has been eroded.
UI continues to cover far fewer low-wage workers, com-
pared to high-wage workers. In response to an inquiry
from Congress, the General Accountability Office (1990)
found that low-wage workers received UI benefits at
just half the rate of higher-wage workers.
2
The lack of low-wage worker access represents a major
weakness for UI programs. Low-wage workers can ben-
efit the most from income maintenance during a job-
less spell. In a low-income family, living on a budget
with limited (if any) savings, a UI check can make the 
difference in preventing an eviction, maintaining prop-
er family nutrition or other urgent family needs. UI is
crucial to preventing such crises, which can prove to be
a perilous distraction from an effective job search. In
addition to maintaining family income, UI benefits
keep low-income families connected to the workforce. 
Low-wage workers face difficulties meeting their state’s
minimum earnings requirements. However, other fac-
tors also play into the low UI recipiency rate for low-
wage workers. Most importantly, low-wage workers are
more likely than higher-wage workers to face non-
monetary disqualifications due to losing their job for
reasons that the UI system does not consider valid. For
example, most states do not consider child care or
health emergencies as valid reasons to leave a job, yet
without paid sick leave or health care benefits, low-
wage workers are far more likely to lose their job for
urgent personal matters. Furthermore, low-wage work-
ers often find themselves in seasonal or temporary help
agency positions that have been excluded from UI cov-
erage by state laws. Finally, limited union coverage in
low-wage jobs in retail and hospitality industries and
other similar sectors leaves these workers without
assistance if they have to face a challenge to their UI
claim by their former employer. 
THE ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD
FOR UI ELIGIBILITY
Improving monetary eligibility rules is one way to
equalize access to UI benefits. This study analyzes the
alternative base period (ABP), a policy reform that
makes it easier for low-wage workers to qualify for UI
benefits. One of the most important reasons that low-
wage workers do not meet the monetary eligibility
requirements is that three to six months of their most
recent earnings are excluded from their UI applications.
The ABP allows applicants to count those more recent
LAID-OFF LOW-WAGE WORKERS ARE HALF
AS LIKELY AS HIGHER-WAGE WORKERS TO
RECEIVE UI BECAUSE OF PROGRAM RULES
AND STRUCTURAL DISADVANTAGES.6
earnings towards the UI system’s monetary eligibility
requirements. 
A total of nineteen states and the District of Columbia
have adopted the ABP (Connecticut, District of
Columbia, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine,
Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey,
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio,
Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia,
Washington, and Wisconsin). The last major research
conducted on the ABP was published in 1997, when
just eight states had the ABP in operation. Since then,
11 new states and D.C. adopted the ABP as part of their
UI program, with nearly half of the nation’s UI claims
coming from states that have the ABP on the books
once Illinois’s ABP becomes effective in 2008. 
The spread of the ABP has been part of an overall trend
of reforms that have made state UI programs more
responsive to an expanding population of low-wage,
women, and part-time workers. The drop in UI recipien-
cy rate in the 1980s and early 1990s captured signifi-
cant attention among researchers and policy makers
and it was recognized that this was due to changes in
the composition of the labor force and the kinds of
jobs the economy was providing, combined with
restrictions in UI program rules. Congress established
the Advisory Council on Unemployment
Compensation, which recommended that states imple-
ment the ABP as a way to modernize their UI
programs.
3 In 2002, Congress specified the ABP as one
of a short list of recommended uses of federal “Reed
Act”grants made to state unemployment trust funds.
4
Like the Earned Income Tax Credit, expanded UI eligi-
bility has been a popular “work-based”policy solution
to poverty in the welfare reform era.
This study evaluates how much the ABP can contribute
to expanding UI eligibility, both in those states that
have already implemented the reform and in those that
have yet to do so. By evaluating the impact on the ABP
on low-wage workers, racial minorities and other
unemployed individuals who have difficulty gaining
access to UI, this report serves as a guide to those poli-
cymakers and advocates who are considering bringing
























































UI MONETARY ELIGIBILITY RULES
QUARTERLY WAGE RECORDS AND BASE PERIODS
The ABP reform is needed because of a technocratic flaw in the system for determining UI eligibility. Employers are
required to report payroll information to their state’s UI agency on a quarterly basis. These reports include informa-
tion, by employee, about total wages earned during the quarter. 
State UI agencies use the quarterly wage reports to establish a base period, or base year, to test UI eligibility and
establish a weekly benefit amount. A base period consists of four calendar quarters. (The calendar quarters are
January – March, April – June, July – September, and October – December.) 
The UI wage record system has a number of broad public policy purposes. Wage records are used to track overall
employment and wages in the economy, and can be used to track whether individuals are accurately reporting 
their earnings for the purposes of child support payments or eligibility for income-based programs like Food Stamps
or welfare. 
As is, the system creates a set of technocratic flaws that exclude the most recent employment and earnings from UI
claims. Employers generally file their wage reports with the state 30 days after the completion of the calendar quar-
ter. For example, the first quarter wage report is not due until April 30th. Then, the UI agency must enter the data
into their system, which can take as long as until the end of that quarter. Thus, wage information may not be avail-
able for UI applicants until two quarters after they are earned. The problem for UI programs is easily apparent. When8
a worker is laid off, the UI system is structurally behind
by up to two quarters of “work credits”that could be
applied to a UI claim (application).
5
To get around this problem, most traditional states
define their base periods as "the first 4 of the last 5
completed calendar quarters." By avoiding the quarter
when a claim is filed and the previous completed quar-
ter, states can be sure that they will have four quarters
of work history to apply to every UI claim. However, the
quarters of wages considered can include up to 18
months prior to the filing of the UI claim and exclude
the most recent six months. 
The SBP poses no barriers to workers who have been
consistently working at the same wage rate and sched-
ule for the past 18 months or more. However, for work-
ers who have had trouble obtaining steady employ-
ment, the SBP can lead to ineligibility. A worker with six
steady months of employment laid off at the end of a
quarter (for example, June 30th) will be found to have
zero UI wages in a SBP. 
THE ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD
EXPLAINED
The ABP is a modification of state UI rules designed to
capture additional wages beyond the standard based
period. Under an ABP, the base period still consists of
four quarters, but the time frame is shifted. Figure 1
displays the different potential ABPs. In Figure 1, the
SBP is quarters one through four of year one, the year
prior to a claim filed in the second quarter of year two.
YEAR 1
STANDARD BASE PERIOD
ALTERNATE BASE PERIOD - ABP I
ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD - ABP II
JAN-MAR APR-JUN JUL-SEPT OCT-DEC JAN-MAR APR-JUN
YEAR 2








FIGURE 1  EXPLANATION OF THE ALTERNATE BASE PERIOD (ABP)9
ABP I includes the second, third, fourth, and most
recently completed fifth quarter, which is known as the
lag quarter. ABP II includes the third and fourth quar-
ters plus both thelag quarter and whatever wages exist
in the yet-to-be completed quarter six, known as the
filing quarter, when the UI application is filed. 
Of the 20 states currently using the ABP, only three
(Massachusetts, Vermont and New Jersey) allow the use
of ABP II or ABP I for eligibility. The other 16 states and
District of Columbia exclusively use ABP I, including all
of the states that have implemented the ABP in the
past five years.
The impact of the ABP on claims can best be explained
by example. 
Example  Marcos files a claim for UI benefits on June 23,
2002, having worked from October 13, 2001 to his layoff
on June 23, 2002. He worked at the minimum wage of 
$5.15 an hour for 25 hours per week (totaling 36.5 weeks
and $4,699 in earnings). Despite this significant amount
of work, Marcos does not qualify using a traditionally
defined base period requiring $1,500 in earnings during
the first four of the last five completed calendar quarters.
His hypothetical state recognizes only $1,481 in earnings
for the 11.5 weeks of work that falls within the fourth
quarter of his base period. However, under an ABP, he
qualifies based on the $1,674 in the lag quarter (and, in
Massachusetts, New Jersey, and Vermont, also the $1,545
of wages in his filing quarter). 
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HOW ABP’S WORK: A CONCRETE EXAMPLE








THE ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD FUNCTIONS
BY SPEEDING ACCESS TO THE BENEFITS
THAT JOBLESS WORKERS HAVE EARNED
THROUGH THEIR WORK EXPERIENCE.10
THE ABP’S TIMING EFFECT
In understanding the ABP, it is important to emphasize
that the ABP does not alter the earnings requirements
set up by states. Workers using an ABP still must meet
the same earning thresholds as a regular claim, but
they are allowed to use a more recent four-quarter
base period to do so. Indeed, a worker who is eligible
using a lag quarter ABP would qualify under the regu-
lar rules if they simply waited to file their claim. That is
because a valid four-quarter ABP becomes the SBP as
time passes and wages are credited under the state’s
normal processing patterns. 
Thus, the effect of the ABP is to merely shift the timing
of the claimant’s UI eligibility, with an ABP ensuring
that more workers qualify for UI during their first quar-
ter of their unemployment. Most low-wage workers
live paycheck to paycheck and quickly fall behind on
paying their bills when they lose their jobs. By provid-
ing a portion of lost wages as soon as possible after a
layoff, the ABP enables UI to minimize the damage
that can be inflicted during a spell of unemployment.
The average jobless worker was out of work for 12
weeks during 2004. Without an ABP, a worker who
indeed has the earnings to establish a valid UI claim
might be forced to endure their entire spell of unem-
ployment without support.
THE BASICS OF STATE MONETARY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS
To qualify for UI, most states require workers to achieve a minimum amount of earnings in the
highest quarter of based period employment, as opposed to requiring minimum hours of work. The
result of using dollar earnings tests is that a low-wage worker needs to have worked more hours
than a high-wage worker in order to qualify for UI. A minimum wage New Yorker would have to
work 311 hours (25 per week) to satisfy the $1,600 requirement in the high quarter but a $10/hour
worker would only have to work 160 hours (12 per week). 
Most states require earnings to be distributed in a certain manner. For example, a state may
require that a workers total base period earnings equal to 150% of earnings in the highest single
quarter of the four quarters of the base period. Even more convoluted are requirements that total
base period earnings equal a multiple of the weekly benefit amount that the claimant would receive
if they do qualify for UI benefits.
UI monetary eligibility requirements are modest, and in most states do not increase on an auto-
matic basis over time. In all states but one, Ohio, a full-time, full year minimum wage worker would
qualify for UI. Overall, one in ten UI applicants are rejected for monetary eligibility reasons, but
low-wage worker ineligibility rates are higher.11
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PRIOR RESEARCH
The U.S. Department of Labor funded two studies of the ABP in the mid 1990s. The first, Vroman (1995), analyzed
data from states that had implemented the ABP, and estimated that the ABP would increase the annual number of
UI recipients by 6 to 8 percent.
6 Workers becoming eligible through the ABP were found to qualify for lower UI ben-
efit checks because of their lower prior wages. Thus, average payouts from state unemployment trust funds were
only have found to increase by 4 to 6 percent. In terms of demographics, Vroman concluded that the workers
becoming eligible through the ABP were “more likely to be younger, minorities and with fewer years of schooling.”
Planmatics (1997) followed up on Vroman’s research with a major study that was able to more fully analyze the
added cost of administering the ABP. Planmatics found that the largest implementation cost was the re-program-
ming of system computers and the training of staff. Programming costs ran $64,000 in New Jersey and $232,000 in
Washington. In terms of ongoing added costs of paying out benefits to these claimants, Planmatics arrived at esti-
mates ranging from $500,000 to $1,000,000 in New Jersey and Washington, respectively. Costs were higher in New
Jersey due to the use of both the ABP I and ABP II. The study also found that moving to an ABP placed a burden on
employers: half of all ABP claims required employers to fill out a wage request form because wage records were not
present at the time of the claim. New Jersey employers reported that it took an HR employee an average of 39 min-
utes to process a wage request.
Both Planmatics and Vroman concluded that the direct benefit costs and related administrative expenses did not con-
stitute a barrier to implementing the ABP option. However, both note that the ABP II posed more administrative hur-
dles, compared to ABP I. Indeed, none of the states that have newly implemented the ABP since 1998 have elected to
use ABP II. 12
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DATA ANALYSIS
This analysis uses two kinds of data to evaluate the implications of moving from the SBP to the ABP, a survey of individ-
uals and two surveys of UI benefit administrators. Data on individuals comes from the Survey of Income and Program
Participation (SIPP), a multi-panel longitudinal survey of the U.S. population, conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. 
From the SIPP, we estimate the share of workers who meet the current UI monetary eligibility requirements in their
state and the share eligible under different monetary eligibility rules. The sample population from the SIPP in this
analysis includes individuals aged 16 to 65 in their first quarter of unemployment in 1995, 1998, or 2003. Individuals are
counted as unemployed if they were not at work, but in the labor force, for at least two months during the quarter.
Monetary eligibility for UI is estimated from the previous four or five quarters of total reported quarterly earnings. (The
Appendix contains more detail about the SIPP data and methods.)
This analysis also uses two surveys of state UI benefit administrators conducted in 2003 by the National Employment
Law Project. Six states (Georgia, Maine, Michigan, New Jersey, North Carolina and Virginia) completed the ABP Benefits
Survey, submitting information on benefit payment information and characteristics of UI claimants.
7 All six states in
this survey have implemented an ABP; the survey was designed specifically to gather information necessary for under-
standing how implementing the ABP has affected the composition of UI beneficiaries and their benefit levels. 
The second survey, the ABP Administrative Costs Survey, also focused on states that have implemented the ABP. 
It gathered information about set-up costs and the administrative procedures used to process ABP claims. It in-
cluded four states from the Benefits Survey—Maine, Michigan, North Carolina, and Virginia—and three other states,
Connecticut, New Hampshire, and Wisconsin. 13
The SIPP data is useful because it covers the entire U.S.
population,
8 employed and unemployed, and allows us
to examine how the policy change from a SBP to an
ABP would affect various demographic groups. It also
allows us to look at the effects of this policy change
over time. 
The two NELP surveys have the advantage of reporting
actual experiences of states that have already imple-
mented the ABP and provide rich detail on how imple-
mentation has played out.
THE IMPACT OF THE ABP ON UI 
ELIGIBILITY AND UI PAYOUTS
To become eligible for UI, an individual must have prior
labor market experience. An estimated two-thirds of
unemployed workers in their first quarter of unemploy-
ment (66.4 percent) met the monetary eligibility
requirements for UI across 1995, 1998, and 2001 (in
inflation-adjusted dollars) (Table 1). Looking across the
first row of Table 1, if every state moved from current
rules to using the ABP, the share of workers who would
be eligible for UI benefits increases by 6.0 percentage
points, up to 72.4 percent. The final column of Table 1
shows the share of workers eligible for UI under the
SBP, assuming no state had implemented the ABP.
The next three rows of Table 1 examine the different
rates of eligibility among workers in 1995, 1998, and
2003. The years shown represent different phases of
the business cycle: 1995 was a period when the econo-
my was moving towards full employment and the
unemployment rate was 5.6 percent; in 1998 the econ-
omy was close to full employment, with an unemploy-
ment rate of 4.5 percent; and in 2003 the labor market
        
   
    
   66.4%   15.3%   72.4%   6.0   64.7%   -1.7
        
1995  (5.6)      67.5   16.2   74.7   7.2    66.5   -1.0
1998  (4.5)    67.3   12.4   73.2   5.9   65.7   -1.6
2003  (6.0)    64.6   17.1   69.6   5.0   62.2   -2.4
        
     
1995  to  1998   -0.2   -3.8   -1.5   -1.3   -0.8   -0.6
1998  to  2003   -2.7     4.7   -3.6   -0.9   -3.5   -0.8
1995  to  2003   -2.9     0.9   -5.1   -2.2   -4.3   -1.4
        
SOURCE: AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS.     
NOTES: SEE NOTES TO TABLE 1.                     































TABLE 1     ESTIMATED UI ELIGIBILITY RATES14
NORTH CAROLINA MAINE MICHIGAN VIRGINIA
  
                
       $164.35        $255.55   $174.03         $232.02  $231.98            $303.72  $126.68            $227.34
    .64    .75    .76    .56 
        15.4         23.4    17.3          23.4    19.8            25.1   12.9            20.9
        $2,532         $5,972  $3,010          $5,429  $4,593            $7,608  $1,639            $4,758
     
              
                   
        $8,793          $27,100  $9,414           $21,981  $11,524            $32,093  $7,137            $24,262
    .32    .43    .36    .29 
        14.8%          80.2%  22.5%                78.8%  15.6%            78.4%  10.3%             NA
        28.1          11.8    39.6          16.5    45.4            17.7   20.0             NA
        57.1          8.1    38.0          4.7    39.0            3.9    69.7             NA
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003
ABP SBP ABP SBP ABP SBP ABP SBP
PANEL A
UI BENEFIT INFORMATION
Average Weekly Benefit Amount
Ratio ABP:SBP




Average Base Period Earnings
Ratio ABP:SBP
Percent with 4 quarters of earnings
Percent with 3 quarters of earnings
Percent with 2 quarters of earnings 
TABLE 2   UI BENEFITS AND CLAIMANT EARNING PROFILE BY BASE PERIOD USED FOR ELIGIBILITY 9
was still in a slump from the 2001 recession, with
unemployment at 6.0 percent.
Across all three sets of UI eligibility rules, more workers
met the monetary eligibility requirements in 1995 than
in 2003. In 2003, moving from current rules to the ABP
would lead to a 5.0 percentage point increase in the
share of unemployed workers eligible for UI, from 64.6
to 69.6 percent. However, the share eligible under ABP
in 2003 is 2.2 percentage points less than the share eli-
gible in 1995. 
Translating the results from Table 1 into population esti-
mates, we find that thousands of additional jobless
workers per year would become monetarily eligible for
UI benefits if the ABP was implemented nationwide. Due
to the implementation of the ABP so far, an estimated
211,000 more jobless workers were monetarily eligible
for UI benefits in 2003; and the expansion of UI benefits
to the entire nation would have increased monetary eli-
gibility by a total of 439,000 workers in 2003.
Table 1 also shows the share of those currently eligible
for UI who report receiving benefits during their first
quarter of unemployment. This share is relatively low;
less than one-in-six (15.3 percent) of those meeting the
monetary eligibility requirements in their state actually
report receiving UI benefits. Many people may meet15
the monetary eligibility rules, but become ineligible
through not meeting the non-monetary rules, such as
their reason for leaving their previous job.
Moving to the experiences of states that have imple-
mented the ABP, Table 2 illustrates the profile of ABP
and SBP claimants in four states, North Carolina, Maine,
Michigan, and Virginia. In each of these states, it is the
lowest-paid workers who gain eligibility through the
ABP, with average earnings hovering around $10,000
during the base period year. Panel B illustrates that
most of the low-wage workers helped by the ABP are
those who are not able to secure full year employment.
In North Carolina and Virginia, a majority of ABP
claimants are those who have just two quarters of earn-
ings in their base period; while Michigan and Maine
both pay a plurality of ABP claims to three quarter
claimants. The ABP allows part-year workers to get
enough of their recent earnings into the base period to
meet the various monetary eligibility requirements. 
Those qualifying under ABP receive, on average, a
smaller benefits package, compared to workers who
qualify under the SBP. ABP claimants are disproportion-
ately low-wage workers, and thus qualify for benefit
checks that are between 25 and 40 percent smaller
than SBP claimants. Furthermore, all of the states in the
Benefits Survey use a “variable duration formula”to
determine the maximum number of weeks an individ-
ual can receive UI benefits. Workers will receive benefits
for more weeks if they earned more and/or worked
longer during their base period. For example, in
Virginia, eligible ABP claimants only qualify for a maxi-
mum of 13 weeks of unemployment benefits, com-
pared to SBP claimants who qualify for 21 weeks. Panel
A of Table 2 shows “total benefits available,”which is
the potential maximum duration of unemployment
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003
NOTES: GEORGIA FIGURES ARE FOR THE SIX MONTHS OF 2003, ONLY. ALL OTHER FIGURES REPRESENT 12 
MONTHS OF DATA.
PERCENT OF ALL 
CLAIMANTS 




























TABLE 3   SUMMARY OF ABP BENEFITS BY STATE
5.5%   NA   5.2%   26,219   $86.4
6.5   42.2    4.7   2,861    6.0
6.2   38.8    3.1   23,114    65.3
2.7   37.4    1.7   4,878    3.8
3.1   39.7    1.4   6,486    4.0
2.1   30.6    1.1   8,776    10.116
checks multiplied by the weekly benefit amount. The
total asset value of ABP UI checks ranges from $1,639 in
Virginia to $4,593 in Michigan. While these are relative-
ly large as compared to prior earnings of such workers,
this is far less than the typical SBP claimant’s benefits.
While Table 1 showed the overall increase in UI eligibili-
ty if every state moved to the ABP, Table 3 summarizes
Benefit Survey findings for the year 2003. Column 1
shows that the range of UI claimants to become eligi-
ble only with the ABP ranges from 2.1 percent in North
Carolina to 6.5 percent in Maine. This is slightly lower
than predicted in Table 1, where 7.2 percent of all
claimants (5.0 percent of the unemployed would quali-
fy only under the ABP divided by the 69.9 of the unem-
ployed qualifying under either ABP or SBP in 2003)
would meet the ABP eligibility requirements, but not
the SBP requirements.
This increase in eligibility is more significant than the
first column indicates. UI is a large program, so small
percentage increases in payouts lead to millions of
additional dollars per year in assistance to low-income
families. Furthermore, column 2 of Table 3 shows that
about two-out-of-five workers ineligible for UI benefits
under the SBP can claim UI benefits in their first quarter
of unemployment if they are allowed to use the ABP. In
other words, the ABP can reduce monetary eligibility
denials by forty percent.
While the increase in the UI rolls ranges from 2.1 to 6.5
percent, total UI expenses only increase by 1.1 to 5.2
percent. Because lower-wage ABP claimants receive
substantially less in UI benefits, the ABP reform can be
made at a low relative cost to state UI programs.
Further, the net cost of the ABP (not shown) is actually
even lower than the 1.1 to 5.2 percent shown in col-
umn 3 of Table 3 because a fraction of ABP workers
(probably less than half given that the median duration
of unemployment spells) would have claimed benefits
after their first quarter of unemployment. Lag quarter
wages during the quarter when a worker is laid off
become SBP eligible upon the completion of the filing
quarter. Those workers who are unemployed for such a
long duration and are enterprising enough to apply in
this manner would receive some UI benefits.
THE IMPACT OF THE ABP ON LOW-
WAGE WORKERS
In addition to looking at the overall jobless population
and UI programs, it is important to evaluate the mar-
ginal effect of the ABP on low-wage workers specifical-
ly. The SIPP data allows us to look at the workers by
wage level, not only by quarterly earnings. A low-wage
worker is a person in the bottom 25th percentile of all
those reporting wages over the sample time frame (in
inflation-adjusted dollars). Table 4 shows the distribu-
tion of workers by wage quartile and the average and
median wages for each group for employed workers
and those in their first quarter of unemployment.
Low-wage workers are much more likely than high-
wage workers to become unemployed. Among those in
their first quarter of unemployment, nearly half (44.0
percent) were low-wage workers in the prior quarter,
while only one-in-seven (14.4 percent) are in the top
quartile of wage earners. Within the bottom three quar-
tiles, the average unemployed worker earned less dur-
ing her last quarter of employment than those
employed. Among those in the bottom quartile, medi-
an wages were $6.22 for those employed, but $5.93 for
those unemployed. This means that within the bottom
three quartiles, those who lost their jobs are relatively
lower paid than those who stayed employed. This has significant implications for UI eligibility. Figure
2 shows that low-wage workers are disproportionately
represented among those qualifying for UI under ABP
rules. While low-wage workers are less than half (44.0
percent) of the unemployed, they comprise nearly two-
thirds (56.3 percent) of those qualifying for UI under
ABP rules. Among those qualifying for UI using the ABP,
very few (7.8 percent) were high-wage workers while
they were employed.
EVIDENCE FROM MICHIGAN
It is clear that low-wage workers are disproportionately
helped by an ABP. In Michigan, the ABP is only available
to those workers who fail to qualify under the SBP, so
we can look at the state to gauge the marginal effect of
the reform. Michigan is an interesting case study
because the low-wage workers in the state face partic-
ular difficulties when they try to qualify for UI under
the SBP. 
Michigan’s monetary eligibility rules require that work-
ers have total base period earnings equal to at least 1.5
times their earnings from their highest-earning quarter
(a “high-quarter”rule). There is also a total minimum
base period earning requirement of just under $3,000.
The high-quarter rule is especially important because
workers with varying hours or overtime pay can have
one quarter of earnings significantly greater than the
others. The high-quarter rule is biased against lower-
wage workers because claimants who have total base
period earnings above $14,600 (20 times the state’s
average weekly wage) are exempt from this rule. 
In Michigan, the average base period earnings of ABP
claimants was $11,524 which is equal to just a third of
the overall state average of $32,093. Table 5 compares
the use of the ABP among low-wage and high-wage
workers. For this part of the analysis, we define low-
wage workers as those in the bottom quartile of the
17
EMPLOYED WORKERS UNEMPLOYED WORKERS
Wages as of last quarter before unemployment
SOURCE: AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS.




















22.6%   $6.01   $6.22   44.0%   $5.83   $5.93
25.1   9.48   9.48   24.7   9.31   9.19
25.9   14.13   13.99   16.9   14.03   13.82
26.4   28.88   23.27   14.4   32.92   23.5318
FIGURE 2  LOW-WAGE WORKERS ARE MORE LIKELY THAN  HIGH-WAGE WORKERS TO USE  
    ABP TO QUALIFY FOR UI



















FIGURE 3  AVERAGE AND MEDIAN WAGES LOWER FOR THOSE QUALIFYING ONLY UNDER THE ABP
SOURCE: AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS
41.6%




QUALIFYING \ UNDER SBP QUALIFYING  ONLY UNDER ABP
35.9%
Figure 3 shows that the disproportionate share of low-wage workers using the ABP lower the average and median
wage of ABP eligibles, compared to those qualifying under current rules. Low-wage workers represent nearly a
twenty percent larger share of ABP claimants than those who are qualifying under current rules.19
distributions of earnings (total base period earnings of
$15,500 or less). The figures represent the share of eligi-
ble claimants in each category that use the ABP to
become eligible.
More than one out of every six low-wage workers (17.4
percent) that qualifies for UI in Michigan does so with
the ABP, compared to just one out of every sixty high-
er-wage workers (1.6 percent). These impacts show the
policy relevance of the ABP on low-wage worker recipi-
ency. Further adoption of the ABP in states with rules
similar to Michigan would be likely to produce such
impacts for low-wage workers. At least in Michigan, it is
low-wage men that benefit disproportionately – with
one out of every five low-wage workers that qualify for
UI using the ABP.
THE IMPACT OF ABP ON LOW-
INCOME FAMILIES COMPARED TO
OTHER ANTI-POVERTY PROGRAMS
While ABP benefits only represent a small proportion of
total UI system payments, they compare favorably to
other anti-poverty programs. For example in Michigan,
federal and state welfare payments were $389 million
in FY2003; thus, the $86 million in ABP payments were
equivalent to 25 percent of the assistance delivered to
unemployed parents and their children through the
welfare system.
10 ABP payments in the state average
$232 per week, compared to just $90 per week for
TANF.
11 On a similar vein, food stamp payments to
working and unemployed Michiganders amounted to
$783 million in FY 2003, meaning that ABP payments
were equivalent to 11 percent of such assistance.
12
Thus, while it is a modest cost and impact reform, the
ABP can be thought of as an important way to deliver
assistance to low-income Americans.
Further, since welfare reform encouraged low-income
individuals to work rather than receive welfare, it is
important that low-wage workers, like other workers,
have access to social insurance if they lose their job.
Indeed, welfare reform influenced the legislative
debate that has led to more widespread adoption of
the ABP. Many policymakers saw UI eligibility as an
important part of “making work pay”for these new
entrants into the labor market. Women exiting welfare
were vulnerable to layoffs, especially before they accu-
mulated significant levels of work experience. Further,
the labor market downturn and relatively high unem-
ployment of the early 2000s has made it even more
important to understand the interaction between the
welfare and UI systems. Having an ABP in place would
ensure that recent labor market entrants with limited
skills and/or wage potential would have access to a
temporary stream of income in between jobs. 
UI is an important safety net for all families that experi-
ence unemployment, however, it is particularly helpful
for welfare leavers and other low-income families. In
most states, UI benefit levels are higher than the
monthly assistance available from the TANF program.
Many low-wage ABP claimants would likely also be eli-
gible for programs like food stamps as well, creating a
meaningful if incomplete safety net between jobs. 
CLAIMANT CHARACTERISTICS 
Low-wage workers are not the only category dispro-
portionately affected by moving to an ABP. Table 6
shows the percent of all claimants in the state using
the ABP to become eligible, broken down by demo-
graphic groups. Disproportionately, disadvantaged
groups (especially minorities and younger workers) are
more likely to qualify for UI with the ABP, compared to
other workers. The first column of Table 6 provides a comparison
between the groups by showing the ratio between the
likelihood of ABP use among the selected population
to the most prevalent group in that subcategory. In the
case of race and ethnicity, 7.1 percent of the African-
American UI applicants in these states needed the ABP
to qualify, compared to only 4.6 percent of white appli-
cants. When we compare these two percentages, we
find that African-Americans are 1.6 times more likely
than whites to use the ABP. 
Gender  Despite a positive trend towards earning
equality, women earn just under 80 cents for every dol-
lar a man earns for full-time work, limiting their ability
to qualify for UI under the SBP. Across years, this gender
pay gap accumulates and women earn just 38 percent
as much as men over their peak earning years.
13
However, this earnings gap is not large enough to
translate into higher ABP use, except in New Jersey. 
Race / Ethnicity As with gender, there continues to be 
a significant pay gap between white workers and work-
ers of color. This translates into more use of the ABP for
minority workers: Hispanic and African-American work-
ers benefit more from the ABP than do white workers.
Hispanic workers are nearly twice as likely to use the
ABP as white workers and African American workers are
1.6 times as likely to use the ABP compared to white
workers. Minority workers are more likely to work inter-
mittently or seasonally, which contributes to their
greater likelihood of needing the ABP to qualify for UI.
Prior research has found a race/ethnicity gap in UI
recipiency. Analysis from the SIPP (not shown) indicates
a 9 percentage point gap in UI receipt between black
and white workers and a 5 percentage point gap
between Hispanic and white workers. The National
Urban League reports the gap in UI receipt to be 9 
percentage points for both blacks and Hispanics.
14
Moving to an ABP in all states could help to close the
race/ethnicity gap in UI receipt.
Age  The largest differences in the use of the ABP are
by age group. According to the Benefits Survey,
younger workers (aged 16 to 25) qualifying for UI are
more than twice as likely as prime-age workers to use
20
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003
PERCENT OF ELIGIBLE CLAIMANTS IN THE 
SUBGROUP THAT USED THE ABP












the ABP. As relatively new entrants to the labor force,
younger workers are disproportionately likely to be laid
off before they have established sufficient work history
to qualify for UI under the SBP. Further, younger work-
ers tend to have relatively low-earnings due to fewer 
hours and lower wages. The ABP allows them to clear
the hurdles presented by earnings requirements and
qualify for benefits. It is the case that many young
workers support their families and need UI benefits
during unemployment.
Education Less-educated workers are slightly more
likely to use the ABP than those with higher levels of
education. This is consistent with the greater difficulty
less-educated workers face in maintaining well-paid
consistent employment and the lower wages that they
face in the labor market.
Other States  Both Georgia and Virginia provided
claimant data for ABP claimants, but not regular base
period claimants so they are not included in Table 6.
However, we can compare data on claimant character-
istics to the data provided in the federally-required ETA
203 report, entitled “Characteristics of the Insured
Unemployed.”Most notably, both states show a similar
racial impact, where roughly half of ABP claimants are
PERCENT OF CLAIMANTS IN GROUP THAT USED THE ABP
ALL CLAIMS
GENDER       
Women    1.0   5.3%   5.2%   2.0%   7.2%   6.6%
Men      1.0   5.1   5.6   2.2   5.9   6.7
         
RACE/ETHNICITY       
African-American   1.6   7.1   NA   2.6   9.5   9.1
Hispanic      1.9   8.7   NA   4.1   9.8   12.3
White*      1.0   4.6   NA   1.6   5.5   6.6
         
EDUCATION       
High School 
degree  or  less   1.3   5.1   5.7   2.3   NA   7.3
Some College or 
College  Grad*   1.0   4.0   5.0   1.8   NA   5.3
         
AGE       
Under  25    2.2   10.9   11.1   5.0   16.4   11.0
26-55*      1.0   4.9   4.9   1.9   6.6   6.1













TABLE 6   ABP USE BY GENDER, RACE, EDUCATION AND AGE OF CLAIMANTS
*REFERENCE GROUP FOR CATEGORY. COLUMN A IS ABP PROPORTION DIVIDED BY THE REFERENCE GROUP.
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003
NOTE: GEORGIA AND VIRGINIA EXCLUDED DUE TO INSUFFICIENT DATA.22
African-American. In Georgia, 55 percent of ABP
claimants are African-Americans, compared to 45 per-
cent of the total UI recipient population. Similarly, in
Virginia, 50 percent of ABP claimants are African-
Americans, compared to just 38 percent of all
claimants. The results for gender and age follow the
patterns above. Thus, while only a small claimant popu-
lation is served by the ABP in these two Southeastern
states, the program has a very positive impact on racial
inequities in the economy.
In general the SIPP simulation data reinforce the find-
ings from the administrative data, concerning the char-
acteristics of claimants. The third column in Table 7
illustrates the percentage point increase in each popu-
lation’s UI eligibility if all states were to move to the
IF ALL STATES 







TABLE 7     SHARE OF JOBLESS WORKERS MEETING MONETARY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS 
SOURCE: AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS.
NOTES: SAMPLE INCLUDES ALL INDIVIDUALS AGE 16 TO 64 WHO WORKED IN THE QUARTER PRIOR TO BECOMING UNEM-
PLOYED AND WHO EXPERIENCED A FIRST QUARTER OF UNEMPLOYED IN 1995, 1998, OR 2003.
All       66.4%    72.4%    6.0
   
Male       67.2    73.5    6.3
Female       65.6    71.3    5.7
   
White       67.6    73.5    5.9
Black       58.3    64.9    6.6
Hispanic       66.9    73.0    6.1
Other       69.6    76.2    6.6
   
Less  than  high  school     46.6    52.5    5.9
High  school  graduate     72.0    78.4    6.4
Some  college      74.0    80.5    6.5
College  degree      81.0    85.7    4.7
   
Married  or  cohabitating     77.5    82.8    5.3
Never  married      56.1    63.0    6.9
Widowed       68.2    72.6    4.4
Divorced  or  separated     72.6    77.7    5.1
    
No  children      72.3    78.2    5.9
Children aged:     
•  Infant  to  5  years  only     74.6    81.1    6.5
•  6  to  17  only      55.4    61.5    6.1
• Infant to 5 years and 
    children  6  to  17      54.6    60.0    5.4ABP. Men would see more of an increase in the share
meeting the monetary eligibility requirements, com-
pared to women, and women would continue to be
less likely than men to meet the monetary eligibility
requirements. Men’s eligibility rate would rise by 6.3
percentage points, from 67.2 percent to 73.5 percent,
while women’s would only increase by 5.7 percentage
points, from 65.6 percent up to 71.3 women. 
Black workers and other workers of non-white, non-
black, and non-Hispanic descent would see a larger
increase in their share meeting the UI monetary eligi-
bility requirements, compared to whites and Hispanics.
Whites and Hispanics, however, would continue to be
most likely to be eligible, while blacks would continue
to have the lowest eligibility rate. In terms of educa-
tional attainment, workers who graduated from high
school and those who had at least some college would
see larger increases in their eligibility rates than would
workers without a high-school degree or ones with a
college degree. Even with an ABP, only slightly more
than half of workers without a high-school degree
would meet the UI monetary eligibility requirements,
up from 46.6 percent under current rules. 
The data shed some additional light on the interaction
on how family status impacts the use of the ABP. The
ABP would increase the UI eligibility of jobless workers 
with young children by 6.5 percent, more than any
other family group. Such young parents are more likely
to have recently returned to the labor force and have
fewer quarters of earnings when they apply for UI ben-
efits. Single parents face particular barriers as they may
be forced to leave jobs to care for their children, and,
not surprisingly, never-married jobless workers would
experience a 6.9 percent increase in their eligibility
from an ABP.
INDUSTRY OF EMPLOYMENT
Table 8 shows information on industry of employment
of ABP claimants. In this case, we use manufacturing as
the reference group; manufacturing comprises a large
share of laid off workers in each state and workers laid
off in this industry are less likely than average to use
the ABP to qualify. An intriguing pattern of industry of
employment emerges from this data, which is the first
to use the new industrial classification system to ana-
lyze ABP claims. In particular, workers in industries with
seasonal or erratic work patterns, not just low-wages,
are the most affected by the ABP. Findings for specific
industries include:
  The ABP is particularly important in the Leisure and
Hospitality industry (hotels, amusement parks, restau-
rants, etc.), which is characterized by low-wages and
seasonal employment. Workers in this industry are
nearly three times more likely than manufacturing
workers to use the ABP. 
  Workers from the range of industries characterized
as “professional or business services,”not typically
thought of as “low-wage,”are, however, more than
twice as likely as manufacturing workers to use the
ABP. This sector includes temporary help agencies and
leased employees who endure ups and downs in their
employment. 
  Construction workers are also likely to use the ABP.
In this case, it is because of uneven work histories,
rather than low wages, that the ABP plays an important
role in fostering UI eligibility. 
  The other industries are less likely than average to
use the ABP. Even though the Trade, Transportation and
Utilities sector includes low-wage retail trade jobs, this
is insufficient to make it higher than average in terms
of ABP use. 
2324
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003. 
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TABLE 8   ABP USE BY INDUSTRY OF PRIOR EMPLOYMENT
All Claims           --     5.2%    5.5%    2.7%    6.6%    6.6%
Manufacturing          1.0     3.2    2.7    1.5    4.3    4.2
Leisure and Hospitality        2.6     8.4    9.0    3.5    12.3    8.7
Professional Business Services      2.2     6.8    8.0    3.3    7.5    8.5
Construction          1.8     5.7    6.7    2.9    4.3    9.1
Trade, Transportation and Utilities      1.5     4.9    5.1    1.7    6.6    6.1
Education and Health Services        1.4     4.3    5.2    1.7    5.6    4.8
Financial Activities          1.0     3.1    4.7    0.8    3.5    3.5
Information          1.0     3.0    3.5    1.2    2.5    4.9
LOW WAGE ABP 
CLAIMANTS
LOW WAGE SBP 
CLAIMANTS
HIGH WAGE SBP 
CLAIMANTS
TABLE 9   PRIOR UI USAGE AMONG ABP & SBP CLAIMANTS
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, MICHIGAN DATA ONLY, 2003
Used UI more than once            56.1%         61.7%      74.0%
First-time  UI  users              43.9          38.3    26.0WORK EXPERIENCE
Workers that have relatively short tenures in their current
job are more likely than other workers to use the ABP to
qualify for UI. Among ABP claimants, 85 percent had
been on their current job for one year or less compared
to just 14 percent of workers qualifying under the SBP.
This is not to say however, that the ABP is only helpful
for inexperienced workers and new entrants to the
labor force, like women coming off of welfare. Table 9
illustrates what proportion of UI claimants are repeat
users. This is a good proxy for past work experience
because repeat claimants worked sufficient hours to
qualify for UI in a prior year. More than half of low-
wage ABP claimants have such a substantial employ-
ment background. The long-term work profile of these
low-wage claimants does not differ from low-wage SBP
claimants.
DIFFERENCES BETWEEN STATES
This study finds slightly different effects for ABP com-
pared to prior analysis. Since the mid-1990s, when prior
research was conducted, the percentage of claimants
using the ABP has declined slightly. For example, in
New Jersey in 1996, Vroman (1995) found that 7.3 per-
cent of claimants qualified for benefits using the ABP
compared to 6.2 percent reported here for 2003; simi-
larly, the Maine proportion dipped from 8 percent in
1993 to 6.5 percent in 2003. It is possible that this
decline reflects an increasing proportion of applicants
who are monetarily eligible for UI benefits in these
states under the SBP. For example, New Jersey requires
workers to earn more than 20 times the minimum
wage in each of 20 weeks of work to qualify for UI ben-
efits. However, from 1992 until 2004, the real value of 
the minimum wage dropped by 26 percent in the state;
thus making it easier for workers earning more than
the minimum wage to qualify for benefits in the state.
15
The three new ABP states from the Southeast all dis-
qualify a lower proportion of the total claimant pool
through their regular base period rules, compared with
the states that implemented ABP earlier, such as
Maine.
16This is because these states disqualify fewer
workers under the regular base period and so the ABP
makes less of an impact in these three Southern states,
compared to other states (Table 10).
Several factors attribute to the easier time workers have
qualifying under the SBP in these states. We can charac-
terize the states as high ABP usage (Maine, Michigan,
New Jersey) and low ABP usage (Virginia, North
Carolina and Georgia) states. In each group of states,
the total earnings amount required are similar, but the
distribution rules differ. In Virginia and North Carolina,
claimants are only required to have earnings in two
separate quarters; while in Maine, New Jersey and
Michigan, claimants must meet more specific rules for
the amount of earnings earned in a second quarter of
employment before a layoff. Consequently, a worker
who earns $6,000 in one quarter and $1,000 in a second
quarter before being laid off would qualify for benefits
in Virginia, but not Maine. In Maine, more workers with
three quarters of earnings need the ABP and thus a
greater percentage of all claims are ABP.
25
STATES WITH HIGH BASE PERIOD DISTRIBUTION
REQUIREMENTS HAVE MORE PEOPLE QUALIFY-
ING UNDER ABP THAN STATES WITH SIMPLER

























TABLE 10  STATE MONETARY ELIGIBILITY REQUIREMENTS & ELIGIBILITY DATA
Michigan        11.2%    5.5%              $2,964       1.5 X HQW in the base period  Claimants with greater than  
           $14,600  in  total  earnings  are   
           exempt  from  1.5  x  HQW  rule
Maine        13.2    6.5                3,487       At least $1162 in  two different 
                 quarters    None
New Jersey      14.5    6.2                2,060       20 Weeks of Employment    Claimants with greater than  
           $5,200  in  total  earnings  are   
           exempt  from  twenty  weeks   
           rule
Georgia          6.9    2.7                1,600       1.5 * HQW must be earned in 
                 two  quarters    1.6  X  HQW  in  the  base  period
Virginia          7.4    3.1                 2,500       The $2,500 must be in two 
                 highest  quarters;  Must  have 
                 two  quarters  of  earnings   None
North Carolina        6.6    2.1                 3,744       Must have two quarters of 
                 earnings    None
SOURCE: ABP BENEFITS SURVEY, 2003 AND U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, SIGNIFICANT PROVISIONS OF UI LAWS, 
JANUARY 2003.
NOTES:  HQW SIGNIFIES THE BASE PERIOD QUARTER WITH THE HIGHEST TOTAL EARNINGS.
The back-up standard in Georgia is 40 * the weekly benefit amount that would be established if the claimant was 
eligible. With the weekly benefit amount equal to 1/24th of high quarter wages in 2003, 40 x 1/24 = 1.6 x HQW. In 




ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD   
Lessons from the Field
The ABP requires earning information that is excluded by standard UI procedures. Claims processing procedures
must be substantially modified so that those earnings can be included in monetary eligibility determinations. 
Computer systems must be reprogrammed, and protocols must be established to track down wages that are not
available in the computer system at the time of the claim. Seven states (Connecticut, New Hampshire, Maine, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Virginia, and Wisconsin) responded to NELP’s Administrative Costs Survey regarding these
implementation questions.
These changes can appear daunting to state agencies considering the ABP. However, in recent years, ABP implemen-
tation has been carried out in ways that can minimize administrative costs. As mentioned above, none of the newly
implementing states allow use of ABP II – the filing quarter ABP. A policy choice in favor of the ABP I both eliminates
an administrative step and reduces the amount of wage information that needs to be collected beyond the wage
record system. Furthermore, no newly implementing state allows workers to choose between the ABP and SBP in a
quest for a larger benefit check. Thus, ABP procedures are only carried out on SBP ineligible claims.COMPUTER PROGRAMMING
Five of the seven states in the Administrative Costs
Survey cited changes to their computer system as one
of the two biggest challenges of ABP implementation.
The ABP requires that claims takers and adjudicators be
able to access a wider range of wage records at the
time when they interview a new applicant. States must
modify the user interface and procedures for accessing
the wage record database. In addition, new modules
must be added to make sure that ABP wages cannot be
reused. Once a quarter of wages becomes part of a
base period, it cannot be reused to requalify for bene-
fits during a subsequent unemployment spell.
Despite the variety of changes that needed to be made
to computer programs, only two out of the seven states
(Connecticut and New Hampshire) engaged an outside
contractor. The other states used internal programming
staff. None of the states purchased new hardware or
software. Table 11 provides information from the six
states that provided their programming costs through
the Administrative Costs Survey. In all but the case of
New Hampshire, costs are modest. As a rule of thumb,
we estimate average staff computer programmer costs
to be $57 per hour ($80,000 per year + fringe).
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Considering those states that exclusively used in-house
staff, the work hours translate into an average cost of
just $58,000 per state. These states receive an average
of $41 million per year in UI administrative grants, 
making this implementation cost equal to just 0.14 per-
cent of total administrative costs.
18
At the time of the Planmatics study, only two states
submitted information about programming costs, with
New Jersey indicating $64,000 in costs and Washington
indicating $223,500. Among more recently implement-
ing states, those taking the in-house route to computer
reprogramming are having experiences that indicate
New Jersey’s experience is the norm.
STAFF TRAINING
The second most common issue raised by states as an
implementation concern was staff training. Several staff
training challenges emerged. The SBP is a bedrock UI
concept that has been engrained in the work practices
of front line staff. Adding the ABP requires altering the
framework under which UI staff operates and was a
harder training concept than most. 
State agency directors also feared that claims takers
would move too quickly to move a claim from the SBP
to the ABP. This is a concern because improperly creat-
ing an ABP claim for a SBP eligible worker could lead to
an improper weekly benefit amount and the loss of
wages for subsequent claims. The latter concern could
negatively impact those claimants who get laid off again
and need the lag quarter wages to become eligible. 
States reported this cost in terms of hours of training
spent. Wisconsin reported the most training hours: 4
hours of training delivered to 450 staff, roughly 2000
hours. Similarly, Maine reported that they conducted
15 half-day trainings in each of the local offices that
they had open at the time. These state experiences
indicate that a half-day of training appears adequate 
to introduce the core concepts of the ABP to front 
line staff. Other states did not outline their training
28
A HALF-DAY TRAINING OF FRONT LINE STAFF
APPEARS TO BE SUFFICIENT FOR AN INITIAL
ORIENTATION TO THE ABP.29
SOURCE: NELP ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS SURVEY, 2003
PROGRAMMING COSTS STATE
TABLE 11   COMPUTER PROGRAMMING COSTS FOR ABP IMPLEMENTATION
Connecticut      1200  internal hours / 896 hours for contract staff
Maine     120        internal  hours
New  Hampshire    $528,000  contract
North Carolina      510    internal hours
Virginia        400    internal hours
Wisconsin      1,942 internal hours
Average internal staff hours    1,013 internal hours
schedule, but rather reported total hours. New
Hampshire and North Carolina each reported 300
hours of training. Connecticut and Virginia reported
smaller amounts of training time, 32 hours and 40
hours respectively.
Administrators from Virginia and Wisconsin emphasized
the need for continual improvement. A particularly
complex problem that emerged after the initial imple-
mentation was the interaction of the ABP with “com-
bined wage claims”(CWC). CWC claims combine wages
from employment in different states. When these
claimants file their benefits, they may appear to be inel-
igible based on wage records from their state of resi-
dence. Claims takers will be tempted to switch these
claims to the ABP, either because there has been a delay
in the transfer of wage records from one state to anoth-
er or because they fail to properly recognize a CWC
claim. The proper action is to wait for the CWC wages to
be credited as an SBP claim. Such interstate claims pose
an ongoing challenge to state UI agencies, and the ABP
has only added another layer of complexity. 
CLAIMS PROCESSING
Wage records
As mentioned in the introduction, the central problem
in handling ABP claims is the ability to obtain lag quar-
ter wage information. With the exception of Michigan,
all the states surveyed set a deadline of 30 days after
the end of the quarter for reporting wages. (Wages in
Michigan are due on the 25th day). As such reporting
deadlines fall in the lag quarter, wages must be speedi-
ly processed for the needed wages to be credited in
the system in time for an ABP claim. 
In the early 1990s, when the ABP was first studied, elec-
tronic data reporting systems were still taking hold.
One prediction was that as an increasing proportion of
employers reported their wages by electronic means
states would be able to streamline their processes. In
four of the states surveyed – Virginia, Maine, North
Carolina and Wisconsin – more than two-thirds of all
employers report their wages electronically. Michigan
noted that while just 35 percent of employers in that30
state submitted their information electronically, these
reports represent 63 percent of all wages in the state.
In four of the states we surveyed, the use of electroni-
cally reported wage records appears to be increasing
their availability for ABP claims. North Carolina report-
ed that electronic wage records are available for claims
within two weeks after they are received. Thus, wages
would be ready for use six weeks into the quarter. If we
assume that half of ABP claims are spread evenly
throughout the 13 week lag quarter, half of ABP claims
could be processed as seamlessly as regular base peri-
od claims.  Virginia, Maine and Michigan reported a
similar experience, with wages generally inputted into
the wage record database during the second month of
the lag quarter.
In Connecticut and Wisconsin, however, wage records
are not fully recorded until the end of the lag quarter.
Similarly, it still takes North Carolina the full three
months of the quarter to process paper wage reports.
The dominant purpose of the UI system is to process
SBP claims, and states cannot be expected to make
wholesale changes in wage reporting for the sake of
the ABP. However, to the extent that states using elec-
tronic reporting can replicate North Carolina’s model, it
will facilitate the implementation of the ABP reform. 
Procedural steps
This section will describe the ways that states newly
implementing the ABP have addressed the operations
issues involved in processing ABP claims. The appendix
includes a claims processing flow chart.
STEP 1
DETERMINING WHETHER A CLAIM SHOULD BE
SWITCHED TO THE ALTERNATIVE BASE PERIOD
When a worker applies for unemployment benefits, a
claims taker begins the monetary eligibility process by
checking to see if the worker is eligible under the SBP.
Not every claim that shows up as ineligible under the
SBP is moved to the ABP. As strongly emphasized by
several of the states surveyed, the first step is to double
check the SBP for additional earnings that might estab-
lish UI eligibility. The SBP wage file could be missing
wages for a variety of reasons. Employers might have
filed their wage reports late or not at all (in general 10
percent of reports arrive late). Claimants might have
been misclassified as independent contractors in which
case their wages would not be reported to the state. 
The initial interview of the claimant is also crucial to
determining whether eligibility under the ABP should
be pursued. A well-trained claims taker should be able
to use the date of separation to assess whether the
claimant is likely to be missing a significant amount of
wages from the lag quarter. For example, if a claimant
filing for benefits on July 15 tells the claims taker that
she started work on January 1 and was laid off on June
30, it should be clear that the alternative based period
would include a robust lag quarter of earnings. 
If the claims taker determines that a re-check of the
monetary eligibility is not necessary, they can normally
switch a claim to the ABP during the initial interview.
The claimant does not have to be officially denied
under the SBP in order to file an ABP claim; nor does he
or she have to fill out a signed request for redetermina-
tion based on the ABP. Such paperwork would cause
unnecessary delays in the claim. Instead, after failing
the SBP, ABP claimants are put in a pending status
when all formal correspondence is held.
STEP 2    
GETTING LAG QUARTER WAGES INTO THE CLAIM
The most straightforward manner to include lag quarter
wages is to access the wage record database. In all states
newly implementing the ABP, claims takers are able toincorporate any recorded lag quarter wages quickly into
an ABP determination. If a claimant is eligible through
this method, a valid monetary determination can be set
up in the same time period as a SBP claim.
The more complicated, and more common case, is that
the lag quarter wage records will not be present in the
system. There are two options for acquiring wage infor-
mation when wage records are absent.
Wage requests and  affidavits
A wage request is a customized letter that asks the lag
quarter employer(s) to provide earnings information for
the individual claimant applying for the ABP. The
employer typically has 7 to 10 days to return the form;
and agency staff will typically use phone follow up to
ensure the completion of the request.
Wage requests require additional effort beyond the
regular wage reporting which is now often handled by
payroll processing companies. The Planmatics report
on the early implementation of the ABP surveyed
employers to establish estimates of the time expended
by human resources personnel on such requests—and
found that the average form took 39 minutes to fill
out.
19The states we surveyed commented that the ABP
did not involve a paradigmatic change in the informa-
tion provided by employers. Most states already use
wage request forms to get information that falls
through the cracks of the wage record system.
Furthermore, employers already are accustomed to
responding to UI claims made by their former employ-
ees. Because UI benefits directly affect employers’UI
tax rates, they are sent paperwork on every UI claim
submitted, in which they are given the opportunity to
disagree with the claimant’s description of the circum-
stances of their job separation. 
Because the newly implementing states have limited
the use of the ABP to those claimants who are ineligi-
ble under the SBP, the volume of wage requests is
modest. Table 12 outlines information on the annual
number of wage requests completed by employers 
due to the ABP (the table includes those states that
provided estimates). The number of wage requests is
compared to the number of new initial claims, a figure
from the ETA 5159 report that represents those UI
applications that trigger a monetary eligibility review.
20
In the states surveyed, ABP wage requests generally
represent between 2 and 3 percent of all unemploy-
ment insurance applications processed by the state. 
Wage affidavits gather proof of earnings from the
claimant requiring them to fill out a form stating the
wages earned in the ABP quarters in question. States
allow for different forms of proof to be presented to
back up an affidavit. The two most common forms of
proof cited were pay stubs that include the name and
address of the employers and W-2s. In special cases,
other forms of proof such as bank deposit slips are
accepted. By providing an affidavit, claimants are
vouching for the accuracy of the information and are
responsible for errors.
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WAGE REQUESTS INVOLVE A SPECIAL REQUEST
MADE BY THE UI AGENCY TO AN EMPLOYER TO
PROVIDE EARNINGS INFORMATION FOR A SPECIFIC
CLAIMANT. WAGE AFFIDAVITS GATHER PROOF OF
EARNINGS FROM THE CLAIMANT THEMSELVES,
WITH THE WORKER VOUCHING FOR THEIR
AUTHENTICITY. STATES NEWLY IMPLEMENTING 
THE ABP COMBINE THESE TWO METHODS.In the early stages of the implementation of the ABP,
states tended to choose one of these two methods.
However, in the states surveyed for this report, the
most common practice is to combine the two methods
(five of the seven states). Wage requests submitted by
employers are the first choice for gathering the missing
information. If the employer misses the deadline for
responding the report, the state then turns to the
claimant for information. The most efficient practice,
adopted by Wisconsin and Virginia, is to simultaneously
send out the wage affidavit and wage request form to
employers and claimants. In Wisconsin for example, the
computer system automatically turns to the claimant
data on the 8th day if the wage request remains unan-
swered after the 7 day deadline. Such efficiency helps
to accomplish the ABP’s goal of getting benefits to
claimants earlier into their unemployment spell.
STEP 3
ESTABLISHING MONETARY ELIGIBILITY AND VERIFY-
ING WAGE INFORMATION
Once a wage request or wage affidavit is processed, a
valid monetary eligibility determination can be com-
pleted. If the claimant is found to meet the other
requirements for UI eligibility, they will begin to receive
UI checks.
A problem can arise if the information provided
through a wage request or wage affidavit proves to be
incorrect (states differ on which they consider to be a
more reliable source of wage data). The wage records
hold weight over the requests/affidavits and could alter
the benefit amount or in rare cases reverse the eligibili-
ty determination. If workers have been paid too much
based on the wrong information, they will be responsi-
ble for paying the money back.
One way to reduce such errors would be to prioritize
employer wage records of ABP claimants for quicker
processing. However, this practice proves too costly
and slow to be an effective means of administering the
ABP. Some innovations in this area, however, were indi-
cated in the Administrative Costs Survey. Wisconsin
indicated that ABP claims are flagged in the database,
and that the central staff receives an alert as new infor-
mation filters through the system. Other states directed
their claims takers to recheck the wage database
before using the wage affidavits or wage requests to






PERCENT OF NEW 
UI CLAIMS NEEDING 
AN ABP WAGE 
REQUEST
TABLE 12  ABP WAGE REQUESTS COMPARED TO TOTAL WORKLOAD
SOURCE: NELP ADMINISTRATIVE COSTS SURVEY, 2003; ETA 5159 
Wisconsin        8,300                   324,053                  2.6%
Virginia          7,500                   239,615                  3.1
Connecticut        2,600                   156,070                  1.733
ISSUES OF CONCERN TO CLAIMANTS
When monetary eligibility includes a wage request or
wage affidavit, benefit checks are delayed. Despite not
having an eligibility determination, ABP claimants still
have to call into the UI agency weekly, and certify that
they are unemployed. Certification of weeks of unem-
ployment is the basis for the payment of all unemploy-
ment checks. Failing to certify means that jobless work-
ers could lose an unemployment check or be forced to
wait longer for assistance. 
In the states surveyed, ABP claimants are only sent gen-
eral information such as a claimant handbook until
their monetary eligibility is finalized. By contrast, once
claimants receive a firm determination, they are specifi-
cally directed to certify in order to receive their bene-
fits. Especially since most UI claims are handled by
phone, as opposed to in person, ABP claimants may
miss this instruction. A better practice would be to
send ABP claimants “a pending monetary determina-
tion”that explains what information is still being
sought and clearly explains the importance of certifica-
tion to claimants in this situation.
Follow up interviews with state officials identified
unsolved issues related to ABP claims. For example,
some claimants may fail ABP eligibility because of an
erroneous wage request or because of confusion at the
time of the application. When wage records  are
processed, this claimant could prove to be eligible.
However, there were no automatic mechanisms for
notifying the worker or adjudication staff of such
changes to individual cases. By automatically recheck-
ing eligibility of claimants, it would appear possible to




Moving from the SBP to the ABP would help many workers, especially low-wage workers, young workers and work-
ers of color, qualify for UI when they lose their job. The ABP is a simple and much-needed step to ensure that work-
ers who lose their job are able to have income while they are unemployed.
The ABP is a “technocratic”fix to an administrative problem in the UI system. The ABP allows a worker’s most recent
completed calendar quarter of earnings to be counted when determining their eligibility for UI and their level of
benefits. For workers who are employed intermittently or are recent labor market entrants, counting the most
recently completed quarter in place of the fifth most recently completed quarter increases the odds of qualification.
This study used three surveys to examine who would be eligible for UI under the ABP, how the move to an ABP has
played out in a sample of the states that have already begun using it, and how much this has cost them in terms of
time and administrative expense.
The most striking finding is that low-wage workers make up an estimated nearly two-thirds (56.3 percent) of those
qualifying for UI only under the ABP. In Michigan, 17.4 percent of all low-wage workers who received UI needed the
ABP, compared to only 1.6 percent of higher-wage workers.
The ABP benefits low-wage workers, but it also benefits workers who are employed intermittently. Our analysis of
what industries UI claimants worked in prior to receiving UI finds that industries with a high share of seasonal or
intermittent employment, such as construction, temporary help, and leisure and hospitality, were all much more
likely to need the ABP compared to workers employed in other industries.35
Because the ABP discounts employment in the fifth-most-recent calendar quarter in favor of the most-recent quar-
ter, recent labor market entrants are more likely to use the ABP. This helps younger workers. Young workers are more
than twice as likely as older workers to need the ABP to qualify for UI benefits. 
While the effects on workers and their families of moving to an ABP are significant, this study has found that the
costs for UI administrators are not overly burdensome. Further, because those qualifying for UI under the ABP are
more likely to be low-wage workers, the payments are not as large as the increase in beneficiaries. In the states that
have implemented the ABP and studied here, ABP claimants represent 1.1 to 5.2 percent of all UI payouts, while 2.1
to 6.5 percent of all claimants use the ABP.
Over the past decade, federal and state governments have promoted welfare reform and a move towards policies
that “make work pay.”Bolstering the UI system and increasing its availability to low-wage workers can increase these
workers sense of labor market attachment. Upon losing a job, they, like all other workers, can get six months of UI
while they search for a new job, rather than having to move onto the welfare system.36
APPENDIX I
DATA AND ANALYSIS USING THE SURVEY OF INCOME
AND PROGRAM PARTICIPATION
This analysis makes use of the 1993, 1996 and 2001 panels of the Survey of Income and Program Participation. The
SIPP is a multi-panel, longitudinal survey of the civilian, non-institutional population in the United States, conducted
by the U.S. Census. It is designed to examine issues related to participation in income maintenance programs, such
as welfare and Medicaid and contains extensive information on individuals’backgrounds, employment and earnings,
and access to services, including health insurance and child-care. Unlike other available longitudinal datasets, such
as the Panel Study of Income Dynamics or National Longitudinal Survey of Youth, it covers all workers and contains
monthly, rather than annual data.
The SIPP data are structured so that every month one-fourth of the sample is interviewed; over each four-month
interval (a “wave”), all sample members are interviewed. During each wave, respondents are asked a set of core
questions, which cover labor market participation, wages, and participation in income support programs; additional
questions from topical modules change each wave. The first topical module, for example, includes employment and
welfare history, asks questions that allow identification of a history of welfare use, as well as labor market experience
prior to the panel. Other modules focus on childcare, assets, training history, etc. 
The 1993 and 2001 panels include three years of interviews, covering from October 1992 through December 1995 in
the 1993 panel and October 2000 through December 2003 in the 2001 panel. The 1996 panel is four years long and
includes data from December 1995 through February 2000. 37
In order estimate UI eligibility, we merge state UI eligi-
bility rules for earnings and hours to the individual’s
state and reshape the data from monthly into calendar
quarters in each of the three panels. We programmed
rules by state and by year, so we can estimate the incre-
mental effect of extending the ABP beyond the twenty
states that had currently implemented it by 2003. The
merge was not done, however, for the smallest states
because the SIPP does not provide a unique identifier
for states that have insufficient observations to pro-
duce consistent statistical results. In the 1993 panel,
these states are ME, VT, IA, ND, SD, AK, ID, MT, and WY
and in the 1996 and 2001 panel, these states only
include ME, VT, WY, ND, SD.
We combine the SIPP data with data on UI monetary
eligibility requirements in each of the 50 states and the
District of Columbia for each year. This data set pro-
vides annual information on UI benefits formulae and
eligibility requirements; we collected these data from
the Employment and Training Administration’s annual
Comparison of State UI Laws and their Handbook 394.
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Our final sample includes those aged from 16 to 64 liv-
ing in one of the states with sufficient observations for
consistent statistical results. Individuals who were not
interviewed in a particular month are dropped, howev-
er individuals are included if they were in the panel
during at least part of the year. 
The use of individuals with only partial responses may
bias our results. Table A1 shows the differences in our
analysis using only respondents who were in the panel
for every interview, compared to including respon-
dents who were in the panel for at least some inter-
views. Among all respondents, the share eligible for UI
increases by 19.1 percentage points.
The analysis focuses on individuals in their first or sec-
ond quarter of unemployment. Typically, UI benefits
last for six months, which is equal to at least two quar-
ters of unemployment. Further, most unemployed indi-
viduals have returned to work within two quarters.
METHODS: ESTIMATING UI
MONETARY ELIGIBILITY
To calculate UI eligibility using the SBP and ABP, we
need a minimum of five complete calendar quarters
prior to the quarter of interest and to focus on those
who have at least twelve consecutive months of record
in each panel. Meanwhile, we need to ensure that attri-
tion rates are as consistent as possible across panels.
Thus, the 12-month period we choose to include in the
analysis is the period between the 9th quarter and the
12th quarter of the SIPP panels. For the 1993 panel,
these four quarters cover from October 1994 through
September 1995; for the 1996 panel, this covers all of
1998; and for the 2001 panel, this period covers from
October 2002 through September 2003. In the report,
we refer to these as years 1995, 1998, and 2003. All vari-
ables are generated by quarter and the final dataset
only includes one observation per quarter during the
interested periods of the panels. 
DEFINITIONS
Individual employment and unemployment 
The SIPP provides seven categories for labor force sta-
tus by month. In our analysis, we consider an individual
employed if they report being employed: (1) with a job








TABLE A1  EFFECTS OF SAMPLE
SOURCE: AUTHOR'S ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS.
NOTES: SEE NOTES TO TABLE 1.   
All          66.4%               85.5%       -19.1
   
Male      67.2                  87.3     -20.1
Female      65.6                  83.9     -18.3
   
White      67.6                  85.7     -18.1
Black      58.3                  84.1     -25.8
Hispanic      66.9                  85.0     -18.1
Other      69.6                  85.3     -15.7
   
Less than high school      46.6             79.0        -32.4
High school graduate      72.0             87.3        -15.3
Some  college     74.0                  83.8     -9.8
College  degree     81.0                  90.4     -9.4
   
Married or cohabitating      77.5             88.4        -10.9
Never  married     56.1                  80.4     -24.3
Widowed      68.2                  87.6     -19.4
Divorced or separated      72.6             88.8        -16.2
   
No  children     72.3                  86.6     -14.3
Children aged:     
• Infant to 5 years only      74.6             85.9        -11.3
• 6 to 17 only        55.4             82.9        -27.5
• Infant to 5 years and 
  children 6 to 17        54.6             80.7        -26.1
   
1995 1998 2003
TABLE A2  SHARE OF UNEMPLOYED WORKERS REPORTING RECEIPT OF UI BENEFITS DURING 
    THEIR FIRST QUARTER OF UNEMPLOYMENT 
SOURCE: CEPR ANALYSIS OF THE 1993, 1996, AND 2001 SIPP PANELS REPORT
  
   
Male           27.8%                20.4%             25.8%
Female          19.6                14.8              20.8
Total           24.1                17.7              23.539
month, absent from work w/out pay for at least one
week, (3) with a job at least one but not all weeks, no
time on layoff and no time looking for a job. 
Individuals are coded as unemployed if they report
being out of work or on layoff at any time. This
includes: (1) with a job all month, absent from work
without pay for at least one week due to layoff, (2) with
a job at least one but not all weeks, some weeks on lay-
off or looking for a job, (3) no job all month, on layoff or
looking for work all weeks, (4) no job, at least one but
not all weeks on layoff or looking for work.
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Quarterly Unemployment
Since our analysis is based on outcomes by calendar
quarter, we have to make decisions about how to trans-
late an individual’s monthly employment status into a
quarterly employment status. Individuals are counted
as unemployed in a quarter if s/he was unemployed for
at least two of the three months of a calendar quarter.
This methodology sweeps those who were partially
employed during a month as well as a quarter into the
unemployed category, leading to a dataset with a total
of 15,857 weighted unemployed observations in all the
three periods of the panels, accounting for 3.76 percent
of the general population.
Earnings
All dollar amounts— individual earnings, wages, and UI
eligibility rules—are put into constant 2000 dollars
using the CPI-RS.
24We calculate quarterly earnings from
the monthly earnings and usual hours worked variables
in the last month of the quarter. If the respondent had
missing monthly earnings data for both their primary
and secondary job, then we impute earnings from the
hourly wage rate and usual hours per week.
25We then
examine each worker’s labor history over the first five
calendar quarters and calculate her eligibility in the
sixth quarter and beyond, moving the base period for-
ward in time for each quarter.
UI recipiency
The SIPP provides monthly data on UI recipiency,
including compensation from states as well as other
sources, such as local government. An individual is
coded as receiving UI if they report having UI income at
any point during any month in the calendar quarter.
Table A2 shows the average share of those in their first
quarter of unemployment who received UI benefits in
the time periods of 1995, 1998 and 2003. 
Low-wage workers
A worker is considered low-wage if his/her hourly wage
in the quarter prior to the first quarter of unemploy-
ment is in the bottom 25th percentile (inflation-adjust-
ed) for reported wages across all three panels.
Part-time workers
Individuals working no more than 35 hours per week in
all jobs are counted as part-time workers.
UI eligibility
To determine whether an individual will qualify for UI,
we examine each worker’s labor history over the first
five calendar quarters and calculate each person’s eligi-
bility in the sixth quarter and beyond; moving the base
period forward in time for each quarter (Table 1). For
example, to calculate the proportion of workers who
qualify for UI in May of 1995, we examine earnings and
hours of work from January 1994 to December 1994,
covering five calendar quarters. In every case, we calcu-
late eligibility for all workers in our sample, regardless of
current employment status. This allows us to determine
the percentage of workers that, should they become
unemployed, would be monetarily eligible for UI.40
APPENDIX II
CLAIMS PROCESSING STEPS USED BY WISCONSIN
1. 
DAY ONE     Initial claim is filed. 
2. 
DAY TWO    Claim is sent to the alternate base program.
3.
DAY THREE    If the claimant qualifies for alternate base,
the monetary will go through.
4.
DAY THREE    If the claimant lacks qualifying wages and
there are no dates of employment in the fifth (lag quar-
ter) monetary denial form (UCB-736) is sent. If there are
dates of employment in the fifth quarter, form UCB-736
is not mailed. In this case, the claim is queued to have
wage request form sent during the next cycle.
5.
DAY FOUR    If there are dates of employment in the lag
quarter for a Wisconsin employer, the system generates
a wage request (UCB-719) and wage affidavit (UCB-19)
and mails them to the employer.
6.
The claimant is then put into a 14 day follow up waiting
period for the wages to come in. If neither the employer
nor the claimant send in the wages, form UCB-736 will
mail on DAY FIFTEEN.
7.
If the claimant sends in form UCB-19 thereby giving the
claimant qualifying wages, the system will hold the
wages until DAY SEVEN. If the employer does not
respond by then, the monetary determination will make
on DAY EIGHT using the claimant reported wages.
If form UCB-19 shows the claimant still lacks qualifying
wages, the system will wait 14 days for the employer
wages before issuing the UCB-736. If the employer
reports come in before that and the claimant still lacks
qualifying wages, form UCB-736 will issue at that time.
SOURCE: UNDERSTANDING AND IMPLEMENTING THE ALTERNATIVE
BASE PERIOD, SUPPLEMENT TO UID 00-22, ALTERNATE BASE
PERIOD, WISCONSIN DIVISION OF UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE,
DECEMBER 22, 200041
Claimant files an initial claim and is not eligible under the SBP 
ABP claims process is explained to the claimant and SBP eligibility is ruled out
ABP claims process is attempted
Lag quarter wages already recorded in database








entered Wage information entered
Wages are credited
Wage affidavit filled out by claimant
Wage information rechecked 
with wage records 
Affidavit becomes source of wage 
information used for the claim
Set up valid monetary determination Set up valid monetary determination
INACCURATE
Wages are crosschecked as wage 
records are processed
Benefits are adjusted by either altering the WBA or 
establishing an overpayment 
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The National Employment Law Project (NELP) is a
nonprofit legal and policy organization based in New
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